The Effects of a Twelve Mile Limit for the Territorial Sea by Brennan, Richard J
University of Rhode Island
DigitalCommons@URI
Theses and Major Papers Marine Affairs
5-15-1970
The Effects of a Twelve Mile Limit for the
Territorial Sea
Richard J. Brennan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/ma_etds
Part of the International Trade Law Commons, and the Oceanography and Atmospheric Sciences
and Meteorology Commons
This Major Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Major Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brennan, Richard J., "The Effects of a Twelve Mile Limit for the Territorial Sea" (1970). Theses and Major Papers. Paper 27.
University of Rho e I 1 d
Kingston, Rhode I 1
SUPER ISED WRI NG





F R THE TERRITORIAL SEA
by
Ric har-d J. rennan




THE EFFECTS OF A T~<lE1VE LE:L I T
FOR THE TERRITORIAL SEA
A treaty setting the limit of territorial \J ters t
t we rve mil es wi l l prob,_':.bly be negotiated . d accented by
most nations in the neL:.r :future. In reas not involving
Gtr~:its, thi l i mi t :,r1l1 have both benefic i a l nd har 1
f ee t s , buf it ap e :.:11'S to be tile best solution that c un
be achieved. HOlever , in order to ensure thdt confidence
in tile free use of' the ace s is mainta-ined, the United
States should ..i.ttempt to have Lne ruded in the treaty a
provisi.on for d channe l of high e s thr ough international
straits. t'lg r eement to such ... p r ovt. s f,o ~Till be if icult
to obted.n and i gre m nt :ts not obt a i ne , the United
St tea shou.Lr... i c iLude , ;-lith its r,jt1fic~).tion of the tre ty,
a reservati.on conc er rung the ill g 11t y of' any unt. L ter 1
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THE EFFECTS OF A TWELVE MILE LIMIT
FOR THE TERRITORIAL SEA
CHAPTER I
I NTRODUCTI ON
The Froblem. On 18 February 1970~ the United States
t.nnounced its \;' i 1 i ngnes s to agree 'to an extension of the
breadth of the territorial ae<:t· to twelve miles, signaling a.
probable early end to our policy, first adopted in 1793,
of claiming sovereign ~urlsdiction only to three miles. On
that date, President Nixon stated in a message to Congress
that lithe most pressing issue rega.rding the law of the sea.
is the need to achieve agreement on the breadth of the
territorial sea, to he ad off the threat of escalating
1
ne.tional claims over the ocean." On the same date, the
State Deplirtmentls legal counselor explained how we , er e to
go about achieving that agreement:
.'\.8 result of our consultations tile believe
the time 1s r i ght for the conclusion of a
new inter n t i ona l treat y f ixing the limit a -
tion of the territor ial ea at 12 miles, and
prOVi di ng for f r eedom of t r ans it throug h and
over i nt er nat i ona l straits and carefully
defined pr ef er ent i a l fishing r i ghts for
coastal t a t es on the high seas. 2
The above statements sign 1 a radical change in U.S.
policy and a reev l uat i on of our maritime interests. Nith-
1n the pa t decade , the U.S. State D partment , 3 the U.S.
Navy4. and Amer-Lc cn pUblicists 5 have all emphas i zed the
1
importa.nce of uphold.ing the three mile limit or ....ccept.Lng
at most a six mile linl1t if this t-mre necessary to achzeve
agr ent . 6 These opponentD of the twelve mile limit have
based their arguments on military, economic and philosophical
grounds. 1n l i ght of these objections to a t'(rlelve mi2.e limit,
in:~.ulry into the J:,robnble results of our new jolley is in
order.
The Approach. This paper will consist of two m~jor
parts. The first (Ch pters II and III) ~ill analyze the
effects of an extension of territori~l w t er s to twelve
miles in areas not involving straits. The second part
(Chapters IV and Y) will discuss alternative regimes for
international straits, 1alyze the effects 01' each ' .nd
consider their respective chances of widespre~d acceptance.
A final chapter wi,ll summarize conclusions and make some




THE FECTS OF A TWELVE MILE LIMIT
IN COASTAL WATERS NOT INVOLVING STRAITS
Introduction. This chapter will examine Borne of the
specific effects that could result from a general extension
of the limits of territorial waters to twelve miles offshore.
The effect of such an extension on the use of straits will be
discussed in Chapters IV and V. In the 1958 and 1960 L w of
the Sea Conference debates concerning the setting of limits
to territorial waters, many arguments were given both for
1
and aga i ns t the twelve mile figure. Advocates claimed it
wou Ld enhance the security of coastal states, protect t heir
legitimate fishing interests and aid their conservation
efforts. Opponents claimed that a twelve mile limit wouId
entail increased duties,2 which many countries can ill
afford to carry out, and would increase worldwide shipping
costs due to a desire by many mariners to remain clear of
territorial "laters. Because the general adoption of 11
twclve mile limit now appear s likely, a reexamination of
these predictions i8 of interest.
Security. Security and economic (primarily fishing)
considerations were the factors mentioned most fre '·luently
by advocates of the twelve mile territorial limit at the
1960 Conference. Subse~uent events have resulted in the
3
twelve mile limit being no longer relev~~t to the fishing
prob lem. The present relt,tionship between fishing and the
t1!elve mi.Le limit ~lill be discussed l :Lt e r in this chapter.
The security issue, however, is still important.
The Issues Posed. The delegates of the less
developed countries and the Communist bloc at the t~'lO La~':
of tlle Sea Conferences considered a twelve mile territorial
sea neccE:sary to safeguard their security. The arguments of
the E~yptian delegate were typical. He said that
to safeguard its national security~ a coastal
Stat needed a rea onab l y bra d ter r i torial
sea to ensure that foreign war s hi ps and mili-
tary aircraft r e unab le to pass through or
over ar ea s c losel y d ac nt to its coast for
pur pos es of intimidation. Smal l countries
placed part i CUl ar importance to that aspect
o the t er r i t or i a l s • • •. lthough
am peaker s had ques t i oned t he importance
or the t le lve-mile territori a l se~ to a
coast 1 t te from the point of ~::1.e \ of
n tiona l security, he would empha lze that
m small countries were deepl y pp r hens i ve
about the pas ibi11ty of f or ei gn warships
and . i r cr f t at ing emo s t r t i ons of f or ce
off their co t s . j
In addition to the points raised by the representative of the
UAR:I the R nian delegate felt that l. the ti-'ielve-mile
breadth Wl::;.uestion b l y made for secu.rity, in that it en-
hanced the difficulties of p rachute landings, espionage,
sabotage , etc ," He ended with a point that was made
repeatedly. Whet her other states understood or agreed with
the uuportance of s wide territoria l Bea or not was
irrelevant because Il each sovereign state was the Bole
judge of its own security requirements.n).~
iUthough the {\merican dele ation at the 1960 Conference
was silent regarding a desire to maint a.i n an effective
d mons t r at i on of force capability, there is evidence to
show that this motive W&S germane to the U.S. position in
opposing a twelve mile li~~t. In International Law Studies
1959-1260 (published by the U.S. Naval 'Vlar COllege), Carl
j;.j. It'ranklin a.rgues strenuously 3.gainst the twelve mile
limit for this very reason. After r f e r r i ng to the deter-
rent effect of the Sevent h Fleet in the Formo a Straits
and the stabilizing influence of the Sixth Pleet in the
Mediterranean~ he di~cussed the importance of this use of
naval forces:
Whi l e it 1s true that the deterrent effect of
a display of force 1n a i ven ar ea of the
world is diffi cult to ea ure~ l ar ly b caus e
it is ps ychol ogi cal ! the Free or d shoul d
strive uncea ingly to ret ain wh t ever advant age
is derived f r om uc h di p l ay . To do tIns, it
would be highly de i r abl e to retain th present
three-mile 1 i.tJ it is i mp r at1ve t hat the
v'ree World not agree to · ext ns i on of the
territor ! 1 s ate ond six m~les. One reason
1s c l ear : ships and 1rcraft may be identified
vi u ly, thou h not wel l., ::;.t s i x m.iles. How-
ever, at twelv mi les it is not pos s i b l e to
see an airc r ;),ft \'lith the nak d eye , nor to
identify even l ar ge warehips.5
The Issues Analyzed. The twelve mile limit will
prevent a strong naval power from legQlly making a. visible
show of naval strength off the coast of a weaker country.
5
However, the importance of this restriction is difficult
to determine. Whatever importance it has derives from the
degree to which a visible demonstr&tion is more effective
than one ~.,hlch c nnot be observed f r o Land (1.. e , , which
remains outside twelve miles). It seems reasonable to
believe that the psychological effect of actually seeing
the instruments of destruction which may be brouglrt to
bear against one, knowing that one has little or no defense
ag ai ns t them, can be important. L rs of gover~~ent6
have been known to lose their nerve d popul a.t i ons of
large cities somet imes have panicked due to such psycho-
logical factors. Certainly, if c. demons tration is conducted
out of sight of land, a government which controls the loc~l
media may be abl e to pr event the lJreSence of a fleet from
becoming gen r 1 kn OWl edge , at least for a short time.
If~ however, the demonst r at i ng force 1s clearly Visible
from shore, this ontLon is not available. In a.ny event,
the leaders of m3.11Y small countrLes appear to believe that
a vis:l.ble s how of "force is a powerful psychological tool
Nith hhich one country ca.n impose its wl11 on another. The
emphas i s he e leaders place on re~king the use of thi8
too1 illegal is strong evidene e of' t hei r be]. :Lef• Thus,
al t hough the effectiveness whtch visibility adds to 1.
show of force cannot be dete in d with any degree of
precision, belittling the importance of this factor seems
6
unjustified in light of the belief in its efficacy dis-
played by those in the best position to judge such a
psychological factor: those agai ns t whom it might be used.
I t is important to note, however, that a twelve mile
limit L'lill not have any effect on many of the traditional
uses of nava l, powe r , 'l'he r e :uirement that ships r main
more than twelve miles from shore prior to ::.:.. decision to
'Use force will not ~ffect their operational cap ";lbil1ties
in any significant Viay. Large ca.liber naval guns ha.ve
r n e wel l in exceS8 of twelve miles. Nav' l attack
plane can fly t~'lelve miles in one or two minutes. The
ships themselves can traverse this distance in less th~1
thirty minutes.
A twelve mile limit will not prevent the type of opera-
tion carried out in Lebanon in 1908. s l ong us the local
government has given its permission, , display of force
which emphas i zes the intention of supporting the local
gove ent agai ns t internal or external threat can be
made with complete leg!lity inside territorial waters.
Finally~ pressure can still be brought to bear ag ai ns t
unfriendly countries by a deployment of naval forces just
outside the twelve mile limit. The benefits which acc ompany
Visibility will be lost, but u. cons1d rable effect still
r mai ns .
7
The r ument cs n be made tha.t since the threat of'
f or c e is inconsistent l'Jlth the United Nat i ons Charter
(Artic le ~), paragraph L~)., there :i.8 no I r i ght ll to make a na.val
ShON of force against an unfriendly country regardless 0
the wi dt h oJ.' te rritor::!.!...l ,'ruters. Such :..in argum nt 1s
mor-e r l ev t to theory t han to J.1r act ice. 1'l1cre if'> no
cloc.r definition of \·rh ··.t constitutes .... threat, end the
sel f-d ef en s e p z-ovi.e ion of the ChD.rter (Article 5J.) Ls open
to broad inter )r et t lon . f ,s ong ~1,S strong hostility
exists bet leen two nations, there will be threats bet ween
them \'lith both side:: c 111ng them \'1 rnin 8 an d c l imine; a
justit'icetlon oJ:' aelf-de f~nse. A mor e pertinent uestion
is Jhet her the broadening of the territori~ l seu vill re-
sult in an increase or ~ decrease in the use of force.
The Use of For c e . Reducing the effectiveness
wit h Nhich '''' bJ.uff can be IDH.de m y, in some cases, make
it less l i ke l y t hat force will be employed. When a natron
can legally m ke an ef f ective show of force, that nation
might be tempted to do so in situations which, objectively
vleNed, wou.l.d not justify the actual use of that force.
If the bluff falls, hot..rever, a sense 0 .( pr i de might Lm eL
the threatening nation to carry out the imp_ted threat
r2ther than publicly back down. Thus, to the extent u
\'iider territor:i.a l se.' ake s a nava l show of' force l es 8
8
effect1ve,~ it may reduce the use of force in situa.tions
where truly vi.tal interests f...re not involved.
Under other circumstances, however, the new regime
may melee the use of force !!!.l?~ likely. If, in a given
situn.tion, E1. strong natLon considers certe.in tntereste: to
be 50 import~nt that force will be used, if necessary, to
protect them, the legal prohibition _gni nat displ yin
that resolve makes tt more probable that force will be
pl ayed . This conclusion rests on the pr esumpt i on dis-
cussed l'.lbove that a show of force is an effective psycho-
l og i c a l tool whereby one country can impose its will on
other without the use of v:1.o1ence• Clearly" no nation
wish.ee to be pLaced in the position of being compelled to
c jul es cence by threats, but to the extent that visible
deterrence (threat) is ~referable to the actual use of
force, D. tool fer the ~.Ireven.t1on of violence is no longer
aVRilable in t ho e ca es where Lack of ac qui es cence will
result in viol ne •
Su.lJl!I:i ry'. 'rne eff'ects of' 8 tt>-'elve mile limit on
security thus appear mixed. AdoptlQn of the twelve mile
limit ~':ill eliminate one possible option for strong naval
powers, but I. a wide belt of waters:: will certainly not be
a I'suit of armour1t 6 for small nations. Strong nations
will be prohibited from bringing certain psychologi c 1
flressures to bear on wet:tker nations .. but the relative
9
pJ:1.yoic: ~l strength of the nations involved is not directly
affected. rlhet hE) r the new reeime \.'11l1 increase or decrease
the ct ual use of violence bet.ween nations (as contrasted
',o,"i t h the thre".t of its use) is a r from cert in.
Innocent PaS8~e for warships. A str~ightforward
reading of the text of the Convention on the Territori'll
Sea and the Cont i guous Zone leads one to believe that \" ar-
t ra , Section III is ant tl.....d : HRight of
shir,s have
territorial
general r i ght of innocent a g through
Innocent _a s age " an ....ub-section A; JlRules p l i c' bLe to
r agraph 1 of ~~rticle Itt states that "ships
of all st.::..tes • • • shall en oy the right of innocent
pass age through the territorial sea.l! Only two r t i c l es
are specifically directed tow~rd mi l i t a r y ships. Article
14.6 reqllires submarines to navigate on the surf,- ceo Sub-
section D of Section III is entitled: "Ru.les Appl i cabl e to
·· arships,ll but cont ins only one article (23). It says that
a coa tal state is permitted to require a warship w ich
doesn't comply with its regulations to leave the territorial
sea. Thus, in the absence of any restrictive articleE~
frticle l}+.l would appear to a.uthorize innocent pa. s
:I.'or warshi.ps, par t i cu l ar l y if considered in conjunction
\'lith Gorfu Channel Case. which confirmed that paas age by
.'
10
w r shi ps thr ough t~rritorial ~\1Uters could be 1.1nnocent. Tl 'if
T i is not the whole story, how ve r .
In consider1n t e ~luestio~ of innocent pas s age , tho
1930 Codi i C.:>.t i on Conf r nee at the ~ e ~PVears to have
_e l t t at ~iD..rships did not have such a right through terri-
tori 1 w t e r e not c ompr i sing str;:~,its, but only thv.t 11 s a
prj ct c 1 matter, stutes ought to permt.t pas
t h e i' ,'ll1ure OJ.' the conr'ez-ence to h agre nt on other
topics" ho ver, full. aiscussion of this topic did not take
lace . 9 Th current situ tion is not completely c r ea r ,
I t hou h cDoug 1 iiurke state thc:rl:; I'strong t e ~ 1 lJ.rgu-
ment a ar v i 1 ble f .n sup ,oru': 0'" the po i t i on 1: that
.nnoc ent pa s ge can be Invoked in u por t of the passage
of rship " through territorial w ters,lO they H.Ieo
c omment thEt I ; there seems to be considerable uncertainty
• • • bout a right of' acceas or these vessels /w".rships7
- '-
u 1 1to the or din y territori a l ea .
The r commendat i on of the Inte:cwltiona ". Law Commi s s i on
as th·~t co etal s tat es be entitled I. to r e qui r e prevt.cus
12
authorization or notification for the pas ag 0 w rshi lJS . ,.
The t: '_uthorizeti nil or t i on 01' the r ecommend d a l't l c l e WG..8
wi ly oppo ed at the 1958 Confercuce nnd w~ s deleted by a
vote of' h7 to ~?7. Al t hough an a.rticle re··lui ring pr-evf.ous
notiLt 'Lcatrf on for the pass e of WA.:csllips through te.rri' or1al
as favored by a major i t y (43 f or , 23 ag.uinst ) ~ it
11
did not become part of the Convention because it did not
receive a. two-thirds nlajority. This article was defeated,
however, not by countries which desired unlimited rights for
vrtrships, but by the Communist and Arab countries which
avor ed the authorization requirement. 13 Tnus, although
practically all countries believed some restrictions were
ap pr o rlate concerning the p ssage of warships through
territorial 1 ters, no restriction was written into the
Convention because over one-third believed notification
was insufficient.
The percentage of states opposln the exercise of
I! i nnocent pas ag " by warships through territorial \ aters
(outside straits) hus probably increased since 1958. At
best then, it is thought that the present regime, which
appea r s to permit warships the right of II innocent pasaage"
but doesn1t specifically say 80, may be retained. It is,
however, entirely possible that a pr ovi s i on may be adopt ed
whi ch re-luires either prior notification or authorization
before a warship can transit territori 1 waters outside
of straits.
Duties of Neutrals. Extension of the territorial se
to twelve miles has the potential of involving small states
which wish to remain neutral in the disputes of maj or powers
if a condition of' 'belligerency exists e A neutral nation has
12
an obligation to ensure that its territory (inCluding its
territorial sea) is not utilized by a.ny belligerent. L ck
of an adequate patrolling force invites violations by which-
ever belligerent finds it to his advantage, causing complaints
to be registered by the other belligerent and involving the
neutral 1n a conflict ~'fh1ch he woul.d prefer to avoid. The
wider the territorial sea the more extensive, and expensive
are the required patrols and the greater the likel.ihood that
one belligerent or another will find it to his advantage to
intrude on the territorial sea. The delegate from Ceylon
felt this consideration to be important: • • • too great
an extension of the territorial sea might well imp ir the
security of the coastal State by involving it in conflicts
arising out of its inability to protect its extended rights. 11 14
Inadequat Answers. No effective rebuttal was made
to this a r gum nt agai ns t the twelve mile limit and it remains
a subject for concern. At the 1960 Conference, two answers
were off r ed , neither convincing. At that Conference, the
Communist count ries s upported a proposaL by the U.S •S •R.
that would have allowed countries to choose any distance
they desired as territoria l waters between three and twelve
miles. Thus, nations which felt they could not carry out
their duties over extended territorial waters would not be
obliged to extend them. As one delegate expLe.Lned :
13
With regard to the responsibility for control,
which devolved upon the coastal state, he
pointed out that States were free to fix the
breadth of their territorial seu anywhere
between three and twelve miles, according to
their resources; States which were not yet
in n position to wield effective control
over a breadth of twelve miles could do so
later, as and when their financial and tech-
nical means allowed. 15
The inadequacy of this approach is obvious. The main purpose
of many states in advocating an extension of territorial
waters \'1 s to provide them \lTith 1. securityll because they
were poor and weak. It is just these countries who are
expected to refrain from claiming twelve miles until they
are rich enough and strong enough to control the extended
area.
The Sudanese delegate took a different approach:
The war ni ng that a wider territori a l sea would
be more difficult to patrol and supervise was
h r ly co p t i bl e with the spirit of co-operation
d und rstandlng 80 widely professed. Surely
the weakness of certaln countries militated in
favor of extending their territor i a l sea, and
should not be seized upon us a pretext to drive
them of t h exercise of a natural right . Sud
strongly upported a twelve-mile limit t hough
fully aware 0 the inherent difficulties th~t
its application would cause: normal progress
must not be hamstrung by temporary technical
difficulties easily surmountable by recourse
to modern techniques and given international
cooperation. 16
Hhile this ar gument nppeals to one's sense of justice, it
is not realistic. The IIdifficulties" involved in exercising
adequat e control over the territorial sea are neither
14
h temporary" nor "technical, II and if one could re : y on true
h international cooperat.Lon , II a territoria.l sea wou l d be
unnecessary. It is precisely bec ·use nations disagree
that legal systems are set up. It may not be I fair" that
a poor country hich II ne d II certain privileges cannot; have
them without assuming obligations, but this fact is un-
avoida.ble. When a state establishes its sovereignty over
an area, it essentially excludes the right of other states
to acf within that area, It cannot cape responsibility
for actions tha.t occur Nithln the area which harm other
8 tates • In times of tens1on or war, when such act ions re
most likely to occur, belligerent states are even less
ild.lling tha.n usual to overlook actions or omissions which
nre detrimental to them.
Subm r i ne s : An Example. The cle~~rest
..
amp l e of
the problems neutrals may face ,~B a result of inade u t e
p trol of territorif:1.1 ~"laters involves the use of ubmam.nes ,
The U.S. Navy's viewpoint of the pr obl em is ~s follows;
In terms of u mar i ne e, the overwhelming
numerical adV t ge is on the SOViet side.
The Unit ed St t es fears that t h e sub-
marines mi ght find sanctuary 1n the
rele.tively e waters encompassed :tn
an extended territorial sea. i ven the
r el at ive i ncompetence of most l.ittoral
stat e to de t ct the presence of Bub-
m rines, and the historic ina.bility of
international law to impose effective
r e l at i on on subm ,rine \o\farfare, such
fe r are not nt i r e l y irrational. 17
15
The basic problem is that submarines can violate a
neutral's territori 1 w~ters with little fear of detection,
but surfac e and a1 r antisubmarine untts cannot. If a sub-
mar:tne being pursued is a.ble to reach a neutr2.1's terri-
torial waters, the pursuing units must either abandon their
chase or openly vlol~te the neutral waters, while the reason
for the:tr presence there is invis1.ble. In this case the
neutral is placed in the position of ~cting either 1n an
pp r ent l y unneutral way by 3.11owing the AS\-' forces to
operate within their waters, or 1n an actually unneutral way
by giving protection to the submarine. In either case, one
of the belligerents will be offended" possibly resulting
in the neutral being involved in a conflict which is
basically none of its concern.
An attempt by the neutral state to intern a submarine
which ill l l y utilizes its territori~l wat er s muy ap e r
to be a solution to this problem, but is an extremely remote
possibility. If the submarine remains SUbmerged, the in-
ability referred to above of most littoral stR.tes to detect
its presence, much less communicate with it or force it
to surface, will make internment impossible. The IJrobo.bility
that an undamaged submarine \·!111 volunt <.irily surfa.ce is
remote. ~ modern nuclear submarine is not requi r ed to
surf'ace regularly. Its best chance of survival 1s to re-
main submerged and attempt to slip away. 11' it has been
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Jur s ued into neutr~l wat ers ~ surfacing would probably be
suf.cf.da L, l'lhile a ge d submarine might attempt to
au tac nd accept internment, two factors ma.ke this course
unlikely. First, arrt Lsubmar'Lne eapons used today are less
likely to dam...age ~rithout destroying than wez-e v.forld W· r II
ve pons . Second, the security c l as s i i' i c-:::.t i on of much of
the e quipment on modern submarines 18 such that it is likely
that the cr w wi l l be unwf.Li.Lng to allo\1J it to f;],ll into
foreign nnnds , and will probr..bly have the ean to destroy
their ship ~fter abandoning it. The fact r emains that
internment of belligerent submarine which violates terri-
torial \'1aters is n highly unusual occurrence. Flar mor e
often, with its inability to act effectively, the neutral
wi l l incur the ~mger of the pursuing belligerent.
The Results. The expansion of territorial t r
to twelve miles will pla.ce obligations on all states to
x r c l ae ad equate control of the area newly under their
jurisdiction. The cost of exercising such control is so
high that most states will probably not meet this obliga-
. 18tion even ~1' they h ve the technology and manpower needed,
thus increasing the chance that neutrals will be unable to
remain uninvolved in hostilities occurring in their are t.
E'rom the view oint of the United States~ then, it
should be recognized that expansion of territori al Hat er s
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\trill reduce the effectiveness with '!'lhich antisubmarine
operations can be conducted in time of hostilities with-
out impinging on neutral rights.
Merchant Ship Routin~. I,a noted in the introduction
to this chapter, the effect of the establla~lent of a
twelve mile limit on the world J s shf.pp tng routes N s the
sUbject of much corrunent at the 1960 Conference. In ::l.ddi -
19tion to the question of the use of straits, the effect of
the expansion in other areas was considered by many nations
to be an additional serious objection to the twelve mile
limit. The Swiss delegate pointed out that l:there was C'.
very real difference between the right of innocent p ssage,
which might be suspended if the coastal state considered it
necessary for reasons of security, and the absolute right
'" f 1 tl i th i h I" 20 h L i01 ree nav ga on n e h g seas. 1 T e iber an
delegate noted that, in many cases, ships would decide not
to sUbject themselves to the jurisdiction of the coasta l
state by utilizing the territorial s e d that J:merchant
ships navigating beyond the widened territorial sea vl0uld
necessarily m~ke longer and less economical runs, thereby
21increasing shipping rates.
The opinion of the proponents of' the twelve mile limit
concerning this objection was clearly stated by the U.S.S.R. :
The ar nt that the adoption of a twelve-
mile l i mi t "f or the territorial seu would
18
restrict the freedom of navigation and result
in longer trade routes and hence push up
shi pping costs .nd commodity prices was c i t e
un ounded, given the generally recognized
right of innocent passage f or merCh~~
ahf.pp Lng through territori 1 'ltlaters.
In Peac . During peacetime, the problem of
restricted navigational routes (outside of international
straits) caused by extended territorial waters does not
appear too serious. The possibility that a coastal state
might ~buse its right to exercise jurisdiction 1n ~n extended
territorial sea Ls rea r , but experLence indicates that such
abuse se ldom occurs. If the problem of pas sage through
straits is solved, the possibility of harassment of m chant
shipping exercising innoc nt a sage elsewhere woul d consti-
tute more of a pot ent i a l nuis ance than a serious threat.
Even i f a coastal state did desire to harass shipping, the
burden thereby placed on that shipping--avoidlng that state1s
territorial waters--while inconvenient, would not be critical
as to time or cost except in very unusual circumstances, and
the f act that the harassing action woul d not be decisive
makes it less ltkely that nations will resort to it.
In War. U.S. military pI er B will, however,
have to consider the effect or twelve mile territorial seas
on shi pping routes used durin ac ive hostilities. Routes
\'1h i c h closely appr oach neutraj, territorial '\fat er s may have
to be avoided, 1f our opponent possesses ub rines. Convoy
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escorts normally patrol ahead of the convoy in areas from
which att.acks could be launched. Since bel:Ligerent war -
ships a r e prohibited from operating within neutral w t er s ,
it ~'I O .l d be prudent to give such 'IIaters a \odde berth.
Navig tional f,ids. An ~,dditional economic l:l.rgument
agai ns t the extension of the territorial sea. 1s that "t he
lddltiona l costs of installing and maintaining navigational
aide . • • would prove to be a serious financial burden
for many states, particularly those which ar-e re l tively
poor. II 23 Although this point was mad by a m.unber of
°4nations at the 1960 Conference,c. it appears irrelevant.
'r'here is no international requirement for navi t i on 1 aids
\'1ithin e. country's territorial sea. Article 15 of the 1958
Convention on the Territorial Sea ' nd Cont i guous Zone states
that lithe co t a l State is re '~luired to give appr opr i at e
publicity to any dangers to navigation of which it has
knowledge, within its territorial se~.ll This is a very
slender reed on which to base a re (lu1rement for an expensive
system of navigational ~ids as a result of the extension of
territorial waters to twelve miles. Thus, although it is
desirable for a country to e quip its territorial sea ~r1th
an extensive system of navigational aids, there is no
re.iuirement in international law that a country do so.
2 0
Fishing and Conservation. Discussion of fishing
rights--and, to ,'3. lesser extent, conservation--consumed
more time at the 1960 Conference than any other single topic.
However, the connection between fishing rights and the terri-
torial sea has been largely severed in the ten years since
the Conference. The majority of those states which once
objected to a twelve mile territorial sea because it NouJ.d
affect their distant water fishing operations have since
claimed jurisdiction over fisheries out to twelve miles and
are therefore in a poor position to object to a twelve mile
territorial limit because of its effect on fishing righte. 25
I\doption of a twelve mile territorial limit ~vill thus have
little effect on the fishing rights of nations. In addi-
tion, recognition that a twelve mile zone is in many ~J ays
irrel.evant to fisheries :md conservation 1s becoming more
26
wid pr ead .
Sl~mary-. In s~mnry, then, the effects of the do tion
of ' t;<lelve mile limit for the territoria.l sea. in coastal
areas not involving stra.its '<1i11 generally be compar'at.LveLy
minor or equivocal. lJ.'he t\l-lelve mile limit will contribute
to Q ~e~~~ of security on the par t of maI l e r nations but
w1.11 D.ctually add to their security only in a limited number
of situations. It may tend to encoura.ge or to discourage
the violent use of force between n tione, dep ndi ng on the
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circumstances. Strong maritime nations, such a the
United States, will have one less option short of violence
available to them in that a visible show of force against
a na t Lon with whom t~ey are L~t odds v-rill be illegal. There
will" however, st i l.l be situations in whi c h :"":l. show of nd.val
.force \0'1111 be pos s i b l e and effet~tive. The t~]elve mile
limit ~'1111 heighten the possibility of nations which ',\'ish
to remain neutral hecoming involved in the quarrels of
belligerents, due to the difficulty of enforcing neutr lity
in the extended territorial sea, especially 1.n the c se of'
submari nes . Nations with j a r maritime interests v;il1
ncount er increased dtfficulties in protecting their ships
from subm r i ne s . The effect of the extended territorial
sea on the routes used by merchant ships will probably be
mi nor , but the potential for hara ment of such tr~ffic by
co tal states is increased. The claim that small nations
\til.l neve a heavy economic burden laced on them because of
the:1.r r e pons i bi l i t y for ne..v1gational aids in the expanded
area its basically allred herr ing" an the relation bet we en
a tt'lclve mile limit and fishing has largely di appe ,r ed .
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CHAPTER III
PSYCHOPOLITICAL EFFECTS OF AG 'NT
ON A TWELVE MILE LIMIT
Introduction. An analysis of the effects of the
proposed treaty must include consideration of its intangible
results. Broad psychopolitical effects may be anticipated
as a result of its acceptance. Indeed, the declared reason
for the U.S. propoBul was lito head off the threat of
1
esca.lating national claims over the oceun ;" pp .rentlyJ
it is hoped that the proposed treaty will cause the nations
of the wor~d to refrain from claiming sovereign jurisdic-
tion over coastal water beyond twelve miles, or, at the
very least that the treaty will marshal world opinion agai ns t
the validity of any such c laims. 2 Another possible effect
is a reduction 1n tensions between nations. Most writers
feel that lack of ~ definite boundary for the territoria l
sea is a major problem area in international law3 and many
imply that agreement on a. bound::i.ry will promote interna-
tlon~l harmony.4 This chapter will investigate the extent
to which general acceptance of the proposed treaty will:
(1) minimize the tendency for nations to cl~im sovereign
jurisdiction beyond twelve miles; a.nd (2) reduce tensions
cimong the nations of the world.
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Halting Further Expansion. Codification of rule of
internationai lu.w in the form of a convention which h_s
overwhelming acceptance ~t the time of its drafting does,
unquestionably, tend to promote stability in the area with
which it deals. An expected pattern of behavior among
states is thereby set up; and, as long as no state's vital
interests become involved, most states will tend to ct in
accor dan ce with this pat t er n . However, there are a number
of unusual factors surrounding the delimlt,o"tion of the
territorial sea whi.ch reduce the force of' this tendency~
Minimizing Factors. Regardless of whether the
high seas are regarded as res communis or res nuills, their
legal n::J.ture is uni'-!ue. 5 When a nation purj,Jorta to subject
a portion of the high seas to its sovereign jurisdiction,
the exclusive rights of no one nation are challenged. The
challenge 1s to the inclusive rights of the world community
which has no organization which can effectively safeguard
such inclusive r1ghts. 6
It is difficult for individual nations to register
effective protests against a cl~im to an expanded terri-
toria l Be~ as SUCh. Protest g' l ns t the exercise of
jurisdiction on a par t i cul ar matter (e-s- J fishing or po l.r.u-
tion) can be effectively made; but, if sovereignty is
cl,:;Limed without being implemented in any specific ar ea ,
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only verbal disagreement (i.e., diplomatic protest) can
be voiced. Certa.inly, a ne.tion which implements ita claims
in a specific way has a stronger case than one which does
not, but in a coastal area where there are no fish, there
1s normally li.ttle done just outside territorial t·w.t e r s
which cannot elso be done within territoriQl w~ters. Then
too, the nation having interests 'Nl1ich !:!.re harmed by 8 , W1i-
1 teral extension of the territorial sea may not have the
means to contest the extension, while the nation which does
have the means may not have a direct stake in the s1..tuat1on
and therefore be reluct~nt to play the role of international
policeman.
Although a nation which acts in such a wuy as to h~rm
the interests of another nation is normally sUbject to
retaliation in kind, this is frequently not true 1n situations
involving an extension of the territorial sea. A st!.lte which
unilaterally uttempts to extend ita sovereignty on the high
Beas 1s usually not only willing but happy to permit other
states to do the same in order to strengthen its own case.
Finally, the vast differences which exist around the
world make a single standard width of territoril:Ll w...ters
difficult to maintain. Since special circumst nces do
exist in a number of countries, a plausible case can be
presented that exceptions should be made for them.?
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The Urge to Expand. Over the past fifty years
nations huve been impelled~ for various reasons, to seek
wider territorial waters for themselves and it is not
certain that twelve miles will be sufficient to satisfy
these pe r c e i ved needs. The forces which tend to l:LInit such
an expansion (e.g., domination of maritime l a o by ajar
po ers ) have been gre ;.,.tly we aken ed , lIhue, it is n s e
to aSSQ~e that u codification of twelve miles s the
maximum limit to the territori::!.l sea will, in itse lf',
pr event further exp nsion.
Reduction of Tensions. A second potenti~l benefit from
agreement on a limit for the territori ..··,l sea is the reduc-
tion in tensions that rnD.y thereby result. As VcDougal and
Burke point out, the current disagreement over the width
of the territorial sea c auaea II wrangling and disputes
'trh1ch., .....11 too frequently j erupt in violence nd in any
event involve cost in disputation and continued contro-
8
versy." Another writer st ... "tes thc:.t there \'li1l be 11sub-
st :.int1<:.:1 va.Iue in just h ving an end to the controversy. I i 9
However, -rh i l e the benefits resulting from settlement of
the controversy should not be overlooked, neither should
these benefits be overstated.
To the extent that d1s b.greement on the w:l.dt h of' the
territorial se3. is a cause of tension 3..mong ~ tions, an
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acc eptabLe agreement on that sub ject ~'fil1 obviously serve
to reduce or eliminate those tensions. To large extent,
however, disagreement on the width of the territorial sea
is not C', cuuse , but :C\, result of tension among nations. It
wou l d be W1re:.:.listic to expect those tensions which caused
nations to differ on the width of the territorial se to be
dissipated by an agr eement on this sUbject.
With the Arab States. The Arab states' conflict
wi t h Israel and violent dis ppr ova l of U.S. policy toward
the Arab-Israeli dispute is the major cause of tension in
Arab-Amez-t.can relations and, in l::lrge measure, is the reason
f'or the Arab I sunited and unyielding stand on d. twelve mile
limit. 10 .Agreement on a twelve mile territorial sea tvill
not reduce this tension, particuLlrly because the united
States is certain to press for a strong reaffirmation of
the right of pas s age through international str~its such as
the Straits of Tiran.
With the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that
tension between the United states and the Soviet Union \·d.l l
be noticeably reduced by American acceptance of a twelve
mile limit. It is true that, due to the xenophobic
tendencies of the SOViet rulers, insistence on a right to
closely approach their coasts was <:l. cause of suspicion and
hostility. To this extent, our insistence on the three mile
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limit caused tensions between ourseives and the Sov i et
Union, even though the United St~tes has general ly
refrained from intentionall~~ violiCJ.ting the regul ations
they promulgate rOI' their clatmed territoric.... l w ·t e r s .
Cl aims of ;{ twelve mU e territorj, ,~l sec, in ,=,:ert:;!.in co..:..ste.l
'" ree.s wer e made by Tsa.r:tst Rus at. a but these cl ·.tms '.'rere
not s a l l - encompa s s i ng nor ~G con~istently ro~lnt .i ned ' 6
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Soviet represente.t1.ves h~.'.ve :: t t empt ed to nn I y . In sp i t e
of the histori c a l backgr-ound o f S r, viet c l.a ma to t' elve
mi l e terrltori-9.1 s ea., there l,.....ere other strong mot Lvee ;-...-hich
impe l l ed them to insist on a t""e1ve mile U..rnit ~:L.t the 1958
and 1960 Conferences: restrict1.ng the flexible use of
U. S. naval pcwe r and championing the cause of sser
developed countries.
The Soviets c Leaz-Ly believed our insistence on a three
1] ]i it t d f' th d ~ 1 t t 12m .. e ."m e emme rrom e nee S OJ: our nava s r "L egy .
The comnunt.et. countries comprise .::1. cont1nent nl:.Llli; ~nce with
interior .lines of communLcatd.on , They re opposed by .::1
maritime alli~nce which is dependent on se~borne lines of
cornrnunicdtions. lJ.ence, it is in the intereflts of the
continent 1 alliance to restrict or n.t 1e.:tst C'..l>st doubts on
the reli~bility of their opponentfs lines of cOIl'~unications.
In addltion~ by opposing the three mile limit, the
Smriet Union found common ground with the lesser developed
countries and was thereby able to act the role of their
'-'8c..
c h p i on _ga inst the United Sta.tes .' nd the at her ffiJ.jor
maritime Dowe r s , most of v.hd ch vere p r t ne r s in ::l.nti-
ommuni s t a 'l l.Lancas , Such' pol az'Lz Lng issue u».... bel1.e-
t'Lc i a to the Soviets and c er t ;;!. i n l y (f,<'.;8 9 . f et or i n their
a pro~ ch t o t e t es t i on of the limit of the territor1 1
sec ,
i 'hese re' sons for insisting on a. t eive mi t.e :U.mit
rer-e c Lee.rLy the result of the comp et i tlon .9nd ncst t t t.t tes
bet~,!een. the Communist ..md i3.nt t - Communi s t blocs. C rut.e cenc e
by the United s t a t in '-). t~'lelve mf. e l t ml t wi l l not , i n
ltself J m;~.t eri.9.11y a fect this ext.atLng corn' etition d
host1..:Llty. 'l'hue, with the Communist countr:tes as ",l i t h the
:j, Y.' ?~b st .~...:.tes, the tensions s ur r oundi ng the disagreement on
the Ilmits of' territorial w~t e rs ar-e not pr1m.~."rily caused
by th3.t d12:1gre ment Gut by basic pol i cy confl1.c.ts bet e n
those n~tio nd thp. United s t nt es ~nd its ~ l l ies .
~lith the Less Devel..£Fed Countries. f. somewhat;
better case Ca.n be made for the theory that acceptance of
the twelve mile l.imit by the Unit d St Ltt e s ~l,"i:ll reduce
tension~ bet.een the United states ~nd the less deve!o'ed
countries of the world.
In the domestic f;olitics of the underdeve l op ed n t :l.on s ,
t.her e ir: l:tttle benefit to be gained by upholding their
sh:.:.rec1 rights in the wn.ters off the co.vat.s r)i' count.rf.co
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thousands of' miles distant, but much potential benefit. from
the assertion at' ext ended sovereignty off one IS own coast.
t·1ost of the underdeveloped nations nave coiorn.e t or
semicolonial backgrounds ~nd look on the three mile limit
i.:l.S a vestige of the "bL\d old days. 1, 1 3 'i'he fact that most of
the countries which controlled colonies in Asia and Af'ric
reaently prefer the three mile lili.Jit contributes "GO the
impr e s s i on th':Lt narrOl·. territorial w t er re devi c of
;: i pe r i ,J.l i s t l. nations. 4 'l'he temptation to "pu Ll, Unc le
r B \\'hiskers fl or lit- ea · the Bri t i s h lion's t· i 1.1 is strong.
I any or.'"' the nev , underdeve l o ed states f ee l t ha t t ey
need a tivelve mile territorial sea in order to protect their
"lc:;,
security interests ..L..... Despite the ·ctues t i cnab l. e logic in
many of' their arguments on the subject as discussed in
Chapter II, it is undeniable ttlat the feeling exists and
C'Dposition 'by the Un'fted states to fulfillment of' the
erceived need at' the underdeveloped nat i.ons is a cause or'
tensior.. Agreement on a twelve mile limit would, then,
remove a source of friction bet~leen the United States ( .J.nd
m~ny other industria lized countries) ond the underdeveloped
naticns of the wor l.d , It should I;. 1 6 0 be noted, howevar ,
th&t much of the existing tension between the United st tes
nd the lesser develo~ed countries is ~ resu~t of the
general polariz:lt1on between developed and developing
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co~ntries. This tension will not be ch~nged by gGner~l
dopt i on of wide territoria l se~.
Ne'llf Tensions. In uddi t i on to reducin . resent
tensions, the proposed treaty contains the seeds of new
tensions ,~nd conflict. U. S. advocacy of .. wide territorial
e wi l l tend to cause hard f ee l i ng bet een us and coun-
tries such as J P J which feel their nation~l interests
re _ui r e .:~ nar-row territorial sea. ost 01' these countries
r ,::,,111e8 of the United St- t es , Although our rejection
of' their position will n.ot, by itself', turn them into
~1t agonlst s , it will reduce the common ground on which our
a l l i ance is based. In.deed, the very process of att pt i ng
t achi ev e agr e ement on a 1i de territori~l se l will be
J.il{ely to cause tensions ;;,r1.th such nations.
AlSO, as discussed on page 12, the obligations which
accompany the rights of a littoral state within its terri-
torial waters Ii l l tend to be a source of friction bet ween
n:...l.tions, par t i cu l ar l y between the more dod less developed
co tries. ~ o st less developed countries do not have the
me an to prevent the use of their territorLll se by
belligerents, r ega r dless of its width. The broader the
extent of territ or i a l waters, however , the more likely it
is th,}.t a belligerent in the future lldl1 have r-eason to
ignore its leg lly neutr 1 character. The potential
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result Nill be the involvement of less developed cOWltries
in conf:l lets ~'lhich ::t.re b"sica l ly none of their concern.
Finally, ~s discussed on page 18, there may be dis-
agr eement s to 110\'1 much regulation of traffic through
territorial waters is reasonabl. A majority of the less
dev loped countries have ltttle ID<1.ritime expertize, but
their strong feelings of nationaliBm could result in the
cstublismaent of regulations within their territorial sea
which 1'1111 be l.ooked upon by others as unwarranted inter-
ference with the right of innocent passage, thus creating
new sources of friction among nations. The wider the
territori se~, the greater the impact of the restrictions
l ac ed on its use, since it is easier to avoid passage
through territorial waters three miles wide than twelve
miles ~'lide.
In summary, then, although it is pzobab Le that agree-
ment on a twelve mile limit ~lill tend t o al l evi at e one
source of tension between the United states , nd the un-
developed world, it h~s the potentia l for cre2ting new
tensions between them. The t ensions between the United
sta.tes and both the Communist and '~rab blocs, however, re
unlikely to be autellorated by acceptance of a twelve




S FOR INTERNATIONAL STRAITS
r.£!he Altern:ltives. This chapter t';ill discuss the
pr obab l e nature of the regime that will be established for
intern~tional straits in the tre~ty extending territorlcil
wat e r s to twelve miles, and wilJ show that J although main-
taining :J. belt of international t'l:~ters through straits
would be very desirable, there prob~bly will be more wide-
spread support for a recognition of state sovereignty with-
in straits. The cnapter Hill conclude \'11th a discussion of
, h et her a. treJ,ty r cogni z i ng tv/elve miles as the limit to
territorial waters <:.!.nd recognizing at .te sovereignty to
th~t distance in international straits \1111 have interna.-
tional support sufficient for adoption and general r d.tific ;J,-
tion.
There are many vuriations possible in the ~1r;,y freedom
of transit through' nd over straits C C~.l1 be provided for.~
but there ~re two basic approaches. The waters comprising
the strait can be reco nl zed ~s being under the sovereignty
of the coast 1 et,::-\te, SUbject to a right of pas s age through
and over the strait for the ships <::l.nd . i r c r a f t of 11 nations,
a a high se~s channel through the strait can be provided,
thus restricting the coastal state1s right of soverei .nty
in the strait to some distance less than t~lelve miles.
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'rhat is, in any strJ.it less than twenty-four miles ide,
the coasrt a L state(s) involved wout.d have territorial
wat ers Leas than twelve miles ~'1ide.1
The essenti~l difference in these two approaches rests
on the determln~tion to the b~sic legnl regime to which
th rial ':.:nd maritime route through the strait is subject:
st .te sovereignty or high s e s t atu s . The implic,;~tions of
vesting the cO~:Lst2.1 stcl.tes t'lith sovereignty over these routes
wil l be covered in the next c hapt er j the discussion here TiL!
be restricted to exp Ladrif.ng ~'ihy the proposed treaty i'Ii l l
have a better chance of acceptance if it is dr~fted 0
to dcknowledge the sovereignty of states out to twelve
ml'Les from aL their coasts, rcJ.ther th.:tn ret;.dnin
of high seas through straits.
channeL
Acceptability of High SeJ.-S Channels. Guinin -lide
acceptance of the high seas channe l concept ..rouLd be
diff'ic"lllt for both p ol i t i ca l and practical reasons. The
r cent dissension over the b r e dth of territorial w ters
is largely due to u fee ling by ~n incre~sing number of
st.ates tha.t sovereignty out to twelve miles is re uired to
protect their interests. Any interest 1,o,rhich can be served
by sovereignty out to t"'lelve miles is at lea-st as important
in straits as elsewhere, and straits often magnify the
i.mportance of such interests. It seems illog1c::il to expect
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states which have maintained a general cl~im to twelve miles,
in the face of strong pressure from the United States and
others, to accept some lesser distance in the most critical
portions of their shore line.
Many less developea countries ~re likely to resist the
concept of high seas cha.nnels through internatlon....l strc:.i ts
due to the specificity \'lhich such a proposal wouLd ent. e.LL,
Because most less developed countries do not have ap pr ec i ab l e
numbers of shiDS nd ~ircraft which utilize intern tional
straits, they would tend to look on the high seas channel
proposal as granting specific .leg" 1 rights to others nd
i mp osing specif'ic l ega l obligations on themselves. t the
Geneva Conferences of 1958 and 1960 the less develo ed
countries showed their unWillingness
• • • to commi t themselves to legal details
on the exe rc i e o r rights an d dut t.es under
consideration a t the conferenc e s . Legal
det, i1 was V~ wed by t hem .8 a t r ap for the
inex perienced or the unwa ry . • • • they
pr ef erred v .u l y gener al ~ t ·t emen to
more exact d f i n i t i ons of leg 1 r i g hts and
obl i t i ona . • • . r.~oreover, greement cn
det i l ed sol ut i ons to problem i n the l aw
Nould hav reduced their tact ic<oI.l mobi l i t y ,
which they did not wish to have happ en .
Relatively weak in po wer- terms, t hey s a
as their main pr ot ect i on f r om the phys i ca ly
p o er f u l ~t rt es both the ab ilit y to D,voi d
being perm ently obl i gat ed to perform
re~J.uired ac t s .nd the ab i l i t y to perform act .s
not yet sanctioned by law . They pr ef er r ed
th~t legal rights and obligations be no
more than moral pe r at 1ves - - br oad leg~l
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oblig~tlons t h t should be fulrilled but
whose enforcement is backed only by the
s ens e of obli g tion of the affected state
itsel f .2
Which Straits are International~ There are strong
arguments in favor of enumerating in the tre ty the specific
straits which are to be considered international. First,
there are lmport~nt legal consequences which result from
the determination as t o whether ." given ar-ea of' the ocean
is high seas or territorLLl wa,ters (e.g., crimina l jurisdic-
tion). Second, as s umi ng the gen r 1 right of innocent paas uge
wil l not be unaqufvocabIy extended to warships (See p ge 10
above , }, the precise Jimits of territorLi.J.. W3.ters should be
clear so that w,;~rships 'idl1 not unt.nterrt.LonsLfy viola.te
these waters. Third J if left uncodified, a given strait
tends to lose its high seas char~cter unless it is used in
such a way as to confirm that character. Transit by
merchant ships does not suffice for this pur90se because
such t r ans i t is permi t t ed through territorial w~ters under
innocent IHi-Ssuge. :Wre'luent use of' a l l high seas channels
by w rships would be an expensive means of confirming
thei.r status and one thdt would urob:lbly generate .f:'riction
bet ween nations.
However, when individual straits are itemized, the
obstacles to acc eptance of high sea s channels ar e a l mos t
insurmountable. Since the Soviet Union does not view the
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Okhotsk Basin and Kara Sea as high seas 3 recognition of the
Kurtl Strait or the Kard Strait as international ould be
reeisted by tl1e Soviet Union. 3 Nor would Communist China,
if' in attendance, agree thEtt the Halnan Strl;.Llt was interna-
tional in character. i+ 'l'he Philippines and Indonesi c La Lm
the many straits tn their reas to be in internal wat.e r s by
virtue of the I: archipel ago conc ept" for the dra ...Tin 01' b sa-
lines, e~d accentance of their basic concept w~uld prob~bly
be the minimum they would require in return for l lo ling
free transit. 5
p'~n un Acceptable Treaty Be Negotiated? It appe r s
likely, then, that the method of gu ranteeing transit
rights through interne.tional strCJ.its which will have the
most uppor t "·Til l be to broaden the existing u.r t i c l e (16 Jj.)
of the Territorial Sea s Convent i on so as to LncLude mili-
tary ships and ,-J.i r c r af t in its provisions. i'l::L 11 a tre .~,ty
whf.ch extends the l:l.mits of t.erritoria l rat e r s to twelve
miles and guarcntees tr,lne:J.t through and over strait s in
this manner be generally a cc ept.ab l e to the nations of the
worJ.d? With a poss i b l e exception in the area of ai r c r uf t
transit rights (to be discussed later), the prospect for
a treaty which a pro~ches the que s t i on in this manne r
appe.az-s good.
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?upportera of c Mor e Na r r 01/f Limit. M y of' the
n ·tions which resisted the exp nsion of the territori. 1 sed
h d distant ~·/2.ter fishing by their nationals as one of
their m j or r ea ons. Developments since 1960 mtke this
re son a lmos t moot. The United St a t e s and ~lmo8t a l l of the
non- Communist nat.Lons in Europe have extended their contro l
over f i s hi ng out to tt'ielve miles from their coasts an d
thus are ~n no position to att empt to prevent other coun-
tries from doing the S.l.me. " not her major reason for resisting
the expans i on of territorial wat e r was b s ed on ~ desire to
pr ot ec t the mobility of the naval forces of the non-uommunt st,
world. Since the United States, the strongest nav~l power
in the grou~, appar ent l y believes, us indicated on page 1 ,
that this end can be achieved by guarant eef.ng p s s age through
and over straits even if the lind.t is moved out to t w 1ve
miles, it is r ob ble that str::.:Ltegic nav mobil:l.ty 1111
no longer be ~n overriding argument aga i ns t the t welve mi le
limit.
One possible exce tion would ppe~r to be relat ed to
the mobi.lity of' submarines, due to the existing re ui ement
tor ubma r i n e s to be sur-r'ace .hen tra.nsiting territoria l
\'mters. The deta i ls o.r the U.S. pos i t i on on this subject
a r-e not clear, possibly due to the security conat.der-at.Lona
involved. It is ossible, however, t nat the United St :.....t.es
feels thd.t current "pe cet Ime" operations could be
38
conducted even if its subm ~rine8 1ere re-,:.uired to make
sur-rs co t r ans it or str~~1ts Leas than ti';enty-f'our mi l es lide,
in instances wher-e permission could not be obtained to make
a submerged transit. It may be tha,t in uar t ime , the decision
\'l!1ether to make x, submerged transit of a str,:dt Hill depend
more on the ability of the littor 1 st~te to detect such
tr:.:msit than on the legal status of such straits.
The Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has long been
conunitted to the pr i nc i p l e of irrevocable rj.ghts of pa s age
through internct10nal str~its.6 This historic 1 position of
the Soviet Union, coupled ~!ith its rapidly incr ea i ng mari-
time strength, makes it unlikely th~t the U.S.S.R. or its
a lli e s Hi l l seriously dispute the principle of a firm
guarantee of' pa sage through international strdits for wur-
ships. The United States and the Soviet Union h~ve conducted
recent talks on this Subject7 and while it is not known
whetiher a.ll differences have been z-eaotved , it seems lilt:ely
that general agreement on most topics has been re ched.
The Less Developed Countries. Ca.ref'ul cons l derw-
tion will have to be given to the interests of' the less
developed countries in negotiating and drafting the proposed
treaty. If their needs and desires ure not satisfied,
there t'lill be insufficient support to permit adoption or
the treaty. 'ILhe claims of Peru and Ecuador to a two hundred
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mi le territoria l se are held with such fervor th t their
b 'ndonment of this position does not appear likely. On
the other hand, it is hard to see how these c l ai ms can be
accepted within the framework of the proposed treaty. The
maj or i t y of less developed countries appear to be in avor
of a twelve mile limit, however, and even if Peru, Ecuador
and , probably, Chile, reject the treaty, there may be
sufficient support 'w'lithout them. There is a possibility
tha,t these three countrieo may event ua lly be willing to
accept, 0.. twelve mile limit in return for the pr ef er ent i f..'tl
J.shing rights envisioned in the treaty, but this must
r e l i 13t i c3,11y be viewed as a remote possibility for the fore-
see ble future.
If the transit rights to be guaranteed by the treaty
through 1nt rn tional straits are stated in broad 2nd
general tems" i t appear s likely that the treaty can gain
good de...otl of support from the less devel oped countries,
assuming the preferential fishing rights meet their re~~ire­
ment a . The rab st~tes may well rati£y the treaty in order
to gai n its benefits concerning the twelve mile lim1.t,
although they may make the reservution that they do not
consider that the provisions concerning intern~tlonal
straits pp l y to the Str;J.its of '1.'iran or Gulf of A~ab;l.
AircrGl.ft 'I'ransit Rights. The probable fate of a
proponal to guaru.ntee transit over international struits for
' i r c r u.f t La difficult to predict. The existing conventions
on the l aw of the sea do not directly tre~t aviation except
to l i s t llfreedom to fly over the high seas' a one of the
freedoms of the high 8e~s.8 There is ne counterpart of
innocent passage over territorial seas for aircr~ft. Frool
the viewpoint of the less developed countries, there ap ears
to be little to recommend guaranteed right of transit over
territorial seas in international straits for d1rcraft. The
Soviet Union has very limited cap bi11ties in the field of
naval ~viation and would definitely benefit from restric-
tions placed on the flexible use of I~erican naval a i r -
poltler.
Unless the United States is able to tie a.ircra.ft
transit rights into some -luid pro ;rt~o arrangement, it is
difficult to see how sufficient bucking can be obtained for
this proposal. If the Soviet Union anticiDates an ex ans i on
in her naval aviation c.:.1pabillties, it may be willing to
support such a proposal. 9 In this cdse, there is an
ppr ec i ab l y greater chance for acceptance , It is probable
that this sUbject was discussed at the recent meetings
between the United States and the Soviet Union referred to
on age 39, but there nas been no direct evidence of Soviet
intentions. Thus" although it \'J"Quld undoubtedly be
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desirable, from the standpoint of the United States, th~t
a i r c r a f t tr.9.nsit rights over str.~1ts are guarurrt eec ,
acceptance or such a propos ...!.1. app ear-s pr ob l emat i c 1 . It
is doubtful that the United states vout.d desire to, or be
ble to, block the proposed treaty solely because it l acked
a guarantee for aircr~ft transit over straits. Thus it
\-i i l l e a umed that the United St",tes will attempt to have
such u r t e e included in the proposed tre9.ty but that
its acceptance \-1111 not be a determining fl:i.ctor for the
United St;;;,tes.
It app ear-s j.ikelyJ then, that there \/iJ.1 be idespre d
support and ~ji.lmost uru.ve r aaI acc e t nee of tre!o.l.ty extending
the limit of the territorial sea to twelve miles. The type
of guarunteed transit through internationJ..l straits lil{ely
to have the gr tes t suppor t will be one that specifica lly
extends the present guarantees to warships and, possibly,
,:iircr~ft. The effectiveness of such a g uarant e e will be
discussed in the next ch~pter.
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CF.APTER V
THE RESTRI CTIVE EFFECT OF STATE
SOVEREIGNI'Y IN STRAI TS
'I'he fa i n Result. This charrt er wil l di cuss the combined
effect of accepting twelve miles as the limit of territorial
wat e ra and recognizing sta.te sovereignty in str3.1ts. The
main result of a t r eaty contxt.nf.ng these two provisions vii l l
be to reduce the certainty with which the world community
can rely on use of international straits less th~n twenty-
four roD es wide. It is true that an immediate effect on the
pat t er n of actual use of the various international str i t s
may not be not.Lceab Le, and the physical effect the treaty
"itIill. have had on the use of straits even after ':. number of
ye.::.\rs is difficult to predict.
The point is that the tre~ty will introduce a new
element of uncertainty into the planning of nations for whom
maritime factors a.re important :1.n the formulation of national
policy, and will introduce new options for those nations
Nhich border international straits. There are situations
in which a strait would be availab Le for use under the
p reaenf regime but unavadLabl.e under the regime wrrl.cb vil l I
be in effect ~fter sdoptlon of the proposed tre~ty. The
relative power position of na.tions 'which benefit from the
use of str~its fill have to be z-eevaiuatied in the light of
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the heightened possibility of closure of certa.in strai t •
These nations vriJ.l be more constrained in their dealings
with those nations which border import~nt str~its.
!'overeignty: The Key. The be.sLc change that wi l l be
wrought by the proposed treaty 1s that it will gr: nt or
confirm, to the coastal state, ~ve~elgnty- over the wa t ers
out to twelve miles from its coasts. This clear recognition
of over ei gnt y is the crucial factor which reduces the
degree to which the world communi t y can rely on the use of
internatlonul str~its.
At present, the status of the seas outside three miles
is either generally accepted as "high seas, I' with limited,
specific claims of jurisdiction being made to various distances,
vfith the recognition that the validity of these claims is
dependent on their acceptability to the 1nternation ; community
(e.g., the coastal waters off the United St~tea); or the seas
are claimed as sovereign w~ters out to distances ~arying from
six to t'110 hundred miles (e.g., the coaat.a l wat er-s off It aly
and peru), with the v~lidity of such cluims being denied by
a. number of' st<;i,tes. Thus the status of 1tlu.ters between three
and twelve miles is either generally accepted s interna-
tional or is in dispute as to its lega l regime. In no case
has a c1 1m to sovereignty out to twelve miles been
universally accepted. If adopted, the propo ed tre ty
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vfil1 e:Liminate a por t i on of t hi.s di sag reement by recognizing
the aove.re Lgn nat.Lonr 1 cha.racter of co~stal '.:1,ter out to
twelve miles.
The Difference. It is lm~ortant to note that
there is a mujor difference between recognition of sovereignty
and recognition tha.t a. natton may justifiably exercise
jurisdiction in an area II/here sovereignty is not c l admed, to
the extent necessaI.:l to protect its interests, so l ong a
the rights of other nations ar-e not 1 p i r ed to an unreasonab le
degree. Sovereignty 1s essentially open-ended und cQrries
implica,tions not pr'eaerrt in ~ cLtim to limited jur sdi ct i on
based on contigUity. An .ct l an t aken by a nation within
its territoriul limits carries a pr e Unl lt i on of leg l i t y and
the burden of pr oof as to its i l l eg lity rests with the
co p L i n i ng at t e , In contrast, a nation -",hich asserts its
Jurisdiction outside its sovereign territory is in the pos i -
t Lon of having to justify its 'l c t i un s to the extent th ,t
they i mpinge on the rights of other nations.
Mari.time Soverel nty . It m:J,y seem that sovere i gnt y
over territorial waters is different in nature from sovereignty
over land :;~re 'l,S j thL~,t, due to the limitn.t1.on placed on
sovereignty in territorial wa.ters by the right of' nnocent
p 8 e , it is 8. l'lj.mited" or Itt) rt i a 11 sovereignty. Such
a r ent doc" not ",.ppea r v::d.id. As Jessu loi nt s out,
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lithe restriction on the exercise of ,jurisd:tction ~!hich is
1m oeed by the right of innocent p sage does not mean that
the rights in territori~ 1 w:.lters are any more limited than
those on the land territory~ where the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is limited by such. rights as those of' foreign emb sa t.e • " 1
The basic nature of sovereignty is the s~ne whether ap p l i ed
to land or sea are~s.
Three Changes. The main argQ~ent of this eh- .ter, then~
is that cle~r-cut intern~tional ~ecognit1.on of the sovereignty
of' coastal atates out to twelve miles from their coasts VJ'11l:
(1) change the present balance of rights between the littoral
state d all other states (to the benefit of the littoral
~t tel relative to ~ strait less than twenty-four mi l es
wide ; (2) make it more difficult for a state to ut i lize its
right of passage through such a strait in the face of opposi-
tion from the littoral state; and (3) thus give stater,:
re:1s0n to take account, in their p l anni ng , of' the possibility
Oi' reduced maritime mobil~Lty. 'I'~"o ex mp .Le s will serve to
i l lustrate the potentially restrictive et'fects of the
r oposed treB.ty on pas age through straits.
Ex mpl e One. The first exam i e concerns n ttempt
to openly restrict p aaage through an internat:l'.onal str~-1it
by the littor a l state. The situ~tion envisioned is one in
which a certain state cl~ims the right to exercise extraor-
din<1ry jurisdiction f'or <..l. ten._ orary period over alrcr - ft
L~6
n Lrrt errurt i.ona L strait, both co sts
of which ~re the territory of the pr oc11imlng state. For
pur pos es of discussion, it ~ill be assumed that the littoral
st at, has claimed that, in order to preserve its security,
it vli l j. henceforth re,.:uire that ah:J.ps and aircraft Vlhi ch
Hi s h to trans:tt the stra.it re ue t authorization f'orty-.
elght hours in dvunce , The right to re uire a r equeat for
J..uthorization prior to traneit necessarily implies the
right to refuse the re' Luest under some cLr-cumstiancea ,
It is possible that such an exercise of jurisdiction
would not be considered unreaaonab l.e even if it included
international ....ra t e r s . It is clear that nations have the
rlght to assert their authority for securi.ty purposes
beyond the territorial sea. This right is accer-t.ed in
principle even though ob ject t.one are sometimes made to G,
particular assertion on the grounds that it is unreasonable. 2
The United St<.ttes and Canada, for examp e, re~luire aircra.ft
to t'Lle position reports well outside the limits of their
territorial ~'1aters.3 However" if C1 ar t i cu l a r state
considered the exercise of jurisdiction to be unreasorl:.::.ble,
the regime of the uaters over which the jurisdiction is to
be exercised becomes 'lrnportant. A st,lte i.'fhleh threatens
to -lt t uck any sht~, or ~ircraft :";htch enters its territorial
w t e r s without pe nn:i.s s i on cleCJ.rly h .8 ~ stronger c c, ae
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than one which thr eate. s to do so in "ters that are
_dmitt ed l y f.nt.ernat t.onat .
Obviously, if the protesting state is , t ~ ~r , it
might well d c ide not to . ccept ~ny restrictions on its
use of the str it and, provided it had the po wer, to use
t'o rc e if.' necessary to exerc:tse itd rights. Howevez-, if the
interests of the protesting stB..te ,'iere import.::int but not
Darr~ount, the r egime of th ters within the str it mi ght
be the determining factor in deciding on ~ course of .et l en .
i\ssu.ming the protesting state h,:td the naval might nee s s r y
to ror c e the issue" it might not be 11i n g to UGe th:.:.t
force on the l:!.ttor·, st9.te in wh:..t is a drJ.i t t ed to be :Lts
territor:i.:-tl w:=tters, but would be Tilling to use force if
attn,ck,ed on the hieh se s , If' the st.atus of the \'/ t e r s is
disputed (e.g., the 1ittor~1 st~te c 1 res twelve 11e and
the urotesting stete recognizes t hr ee miles with a twenty
mile atrDlt i n ue tion ) the 9r ot est i ng st:ltesdees not hsve
strong:l cuae as it does if ull gree that high seas
are involved, but s t i t L has a better c : ae than if :.111 agz-ee
no high seas are involved.
Ex.1.'Jnr /1e Ti,oJo. The second ex p Le involves count r y
wht cb wishes t o pr ev ent the pass e of shi s throu h nn
international strait which is twenty m41es wide n whi c h
is therefore tot .Ily encompa ssed by her territor!;.'l w ter s
(. s uming the proposed treCtty has been adopted). This
country covertly lays ~ minefield in the str~it, nnounces
discovery of the minefield, claims it has been laid by
parties unknown and declares the str::l.it closed perd ing
removal of the mines. Unfortunately, it cannot remove the
mines until minesweepers can be obtuined. Being a poor
country, this may t ake some time, Ni;;l.tural ' y, minesweepers
of gr es s i ve , imperl l i s t (or Communist) nat Lone ~lill not
be per:mitted tc cledr the minefield.
P.S cle.'Jrly sta.ted by the Lnternat.Lona t Court in the
Corfu GhE~el Case, ~ny uttempt by unother n~tlon to exercise
self-help by uni lateru ly clearing the minefield is u. viola-
tion of the sovereignty of the state 1n whose territorial
wuters the mines are 1 ~t id and is, under international Law,
f or bi dden . This 1.s true, even though the minefield is in
an Lrrter'nat.LoneL strci.it. 4 'lIhue J other countries would
either have to forego the use of the strait in ~ue8tion
until the l:l.ttori:.l.l state cleared the mlnef1.eld" d.t t em. t to
transit the str~it without first sweeping it, or sweep the
minefield in open defiance of established internat1on~1 l aw.
This is a change from the present situation in th~t as long
as a country (e.g., the United States) doen not recognize
the twelve mile limit, there ~re l eg I grounds for it to
clear ~ ch~nnel through the field provided its mines~eeper8
rern:.::.in clear of' recognized terrttorial w.J.ters.
1-t9
rl' l ere ':ire similarities between a situutlon :1:n wni.ch a.
str..;."it 1s mined and the closure of the Suez C.:..tn 1 1n 1956.
In the L~tter case, a clearing operation was undertaken
under United Nations auspices. While..1 similar ppr ocl ch
to clearing ,j. minefield is a possibi :;..lty, the c,tential.
differences in the two situations should not be overlooked.
It was in the interests of the UAR to ugree to clear".nce of
the co.nul due to the revenues derived from its use; and the
oper~tion was not seriously opposed by ~ny of the major
powe r s . It is unlikely that the first condition would be
duplicated 1n the case of a mined strait, :i.n d it would be
aomewhat naive to assume there would necessarily be agree-
ment by the major powers to a cieu.r1ng o·~ eru.t ion under United
N3.tions auspices, even if the littor'J.l state made no objec-
tion. In ~ny event, the strait would be closed for ~n
ppr ee Lab Le :;;eriod of time \'1hich, in 1tse :f, might weil
achieve the purposes of the state which laid the minefield.
Th~Impor anEe of Straits. In order to place the
pr ob l ems posed :;'bove 1n the:tr .~) roper per spect i ve ., it is
necesa..ry to 1.l1dlcate the :f.mIJOrt,,"nce of' the use of straits
to the nat Lens of the world. Both the number of' str.?- its
Lnvo rved nd the effect of their closure ·'~ re r e t event , ~rhe
number of' etra.i ts is large. One hundred eleven importunt
str,ilts ·~re less than twenty-four miles VI _"i de. Of these,
t~lenty-three a r e less than six miles \V'ide. Thus, under
the new tre at y eighty-eight ne str""its ~'li ll be univer s lly
recognized to be completely encompassed by territorial
l,'Iaters. See 'l'<.l.ble I.
lfhe effect of the closure of' one 01' the international
straits listed in 'la-ble I varies from insignif:l.cant to
cataat r ophf,c , depending on the specLt'Lc strQit involved,
but many ·:tr e Lmpor-t arrt , '£he effect of the closure of
Gibraltar--the c omp ete cutting off of the Ved1terr;;;.ne;:il1
anc BI-J.~k s f r om the rest of the 0ce~ns of tbe ~orld--is
too obvicus to need elaboration. ether t:ftrdits, although
l e s s obvf.ous Ly v Lt.a i , ar-e of imposing lmJ;Jortsmce. If the
str..dts of 1 1 CC ';;l. were closed, the shi pi ng route from
Hong Kong to C llcut, Indl<:l., wout.d be Lncz-eased by L~6% and
103 hours steamin.g at fifteen knots. Even s OIlle trans-
p c1f'i c tr~ ' f c is heavily dependent on the use of str.';.l,its.
If no str~its less than twenty-four miles could be used,
the ste::uning di9tance h&t\'/een S:in Pranc t.sco end Colombo,
(;eylon, wouLd be incr~ased by 1.tJ.most twelve hundred miles. 5
8ummar~> l-idoptlon of the pz-op oaed treaty \"i 11 have no
direct effect on the use of international str~~its a s long
as friendly rel:J.tions exist between the user nat Lons ana
the v~rious littoral states. Nor wil l its provin1ons be
oi ' critical im.port~ .nce when trUly vital interests z-e r t
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stake. 'The treaty does contain the potential, however, to
restrict the free use of straits under t~\[enty-f'our mi les TJlide
when relatione between nations are strained (a common occur-
rence) and vital interests are not involved. ,:.ehus, even
when relations are friendly, the possibility of dis gree-
ment in the future \'1111 probably cause the treaty to have
an indirect effect on the p l ans und policies of nations




CONCLUSIONS AND RECO DP·TIONS
The Twelve Mi l e Limit. In perspective, the advantclges
and dis' dvuntages of general acceotiance of twelve mil-es c.:.s
the limit to territorial wat.ez-s , as discussed in Ch.::..Lpters II
und III, appea r f3.1rly evenly b':11anced. The resultant en-
croachment on inclusive rights is regrettable but is app~rent ly
unavof.dab re , p':l.rticula.rly in light o-r the recently announced
wi1 11ngness of the United Stdtes to accept a twelve mile
limit. .~lthough an attemIJt was made to reserve our position
regarding the three mile limit pending satisfactory negotia-
tion of' the proposed treaty, our offer to accept twelve miles
makes the upholding of uny lesser limit n impossible task
and, except 1n the short run, an untenao l.e position. 1
WhY Our POl_icy Changed. T\\fO motives, one v lid and
one invalid, may have caused the policy decision to ~ccept
twelve miles. Americans have u tendency to believe that
all problems have solutions. The decision to acc ept twelve
miles may have been based on a hope th~J.t this accept ane e
ivill enable us to achieve J. 1\ fincll aoLut.Lon'' to the pr ob l ems
surrounding the limits of the territorial sea. It is
submi t t ed th~t a good c~se can be made for the urgument that
5 ' ~.J
this is a problem for tih1ch there is no sa.tisf.:1ctory I , soJ.u-
2tion. " Some prob ems should be "managed" rather t han
1\ solved. I!
The major valid justification for our proposed ~cceptance
of n exp ded territorial sea is contained in the President's
remark luot ed on page one. To the extent that cceptance
of twelve miles will aid in preventing even greater expansion,
"i t may be desirable. Whether it will, in f~ct, acco p l i sh
this end is far from certain, but a belief that it wi l l is
not unreasonable.
The Straits tl;Uestion. However, the prospect of
sovereign jurisdiction over international str;:",lts, as
discussed in Chapters IV and V cannot be accepted "lIJith an
e.lual degree of fatalism. These straits ar e the classical
'choke points" of mr.~rit 1me strategy and confidence in their
free use must not be undermined.
Recommendations. In spite of the difficUlties outlined
in Ch,1pter IV, the United St ~lte8 should make a determined
effort to have transit through international straits
guaranteed by means of high seas channels through those
str:lits and to have the ma.ximum possible number of strdits
specifically designated as international.
If this subject has not already been discussed, it would
be wise to uttempt to determine its orobable reception by
54
other nations in adv~nce of the conference. This might
best be done through an intermediary so ~s to reduce the
possibi l ity that the .-lue s t i on would become in.volved in
issues of the Cold \liar or of deveIopf.ng versus developed
countries.
Only if transit through international straits is
guarunteed by means of specifically designated high seas
channels can 'we be confident th~,.t the gener a l extension of'
territorial w2.ters to tVlelve miles will not result in the
eventual throttling of free and effective use of the high
see.s , If fully implemented, the concept of high seas
channels would largely solve the problem of aircraft ~nd
submarine transit rights. Aircraft rights could, however,
be used ~8 a bargaining poi nt if their restriction might
enable the basic concept to be accepted. Prior notifica-
tion or even prior uut hor i zat i on could be re~uired for air-
craft transiting international Btr~its. Such a restriction
might prove troublesome in some situations but would be
acceptable tf necessary to guarantee the free passage of
ships.
I\n Alternative. B cau e accomplishment of the
above pr oposa l might pr ove lm~_\ossible, consideration should
be given to altern~t ive possibilities. If it is impossible
to g in acceptance of 3. trea.ty embodying high seus channels
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through straits which clearly designates the straits to
be considered internation 1 , the next best appr oac h is to
at t em_t to retain the principle of high seas channels, but
to define the str;:~it8 to which the principle appi.Lea only
in a enera-I '!<'fay . Such an a pproach \·,rill undoubtedly result
in many straits losing (or never gaining) internation~'.l
charact.er , but if' the 1!Tinciple of htgh s eas ch .nnel.s
through internn.tiona.l straits is accept ed , there l~!i 1 1 'lays
remain the possibility of' extending lts appl ic~b i:aty .
A Last Resort. If, as is possible, neither of the
above p ropoasLs 1s acceptab).e , it is likely that the treaty
will extend the present system regulating the use of straits,
f,robably broadened to give warships some specific rights.
Refusal to ratify the treaty will be of little benefit to
the United States, but a reservatton should be in~ uded in
our ri~tlf1cation. The reservation should state that it is
our pos:ttion that the rights of users of international straits
are in no Wd.y inferior to the rights of the ccaatut stat'e( s)
involved and that we reserve the right to judge the reasonable-
ness of any attempt to impose regulations or restrictions on
the use of international straits and to a ccept, or reject
th s we deem roper. It is gr-ant ed that the ut:Llity of
this reservation is open to ·...uestion. Its l ega l effect is
like\'lise '3.drn1ttedly uncertain. Both would be strengthened
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by similar reservations by other countries. It se:ems un-
likely that the reservut'lon woutd work to our d1s~ldv:J,ntage,
nowever , considering the f :1ct that u good CCkBe can be m de
that the interests of the United States woul.d not be
jeopardized even if the territorial sea were entirely
-,
abolished.~
As with most last resorts, this reservation is ~n
attemot to salv ~ge what we can frcml a basically unsatis f actory
situation; in this case an attem:Jt to retain some freedom of'
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